Prior art: agents and benchmarks for science
This chapter exists so that nothing in meeting 13 is specified from scratch. Systems that automate parts of research already exist, and so do benchmarks that score them. Before proposing an architecture or a test, find out whether it has been built, and what happened.
Every entry carries a resolvable identifier, a DOI or an arXiv ID, so the list can be worked through by a person or by a program. Entries were checked against publisher or arXiv records; where a project has multiple versions, the identifier points at the version consulted.
How to read the last column
The rightmost column is the point of the chapter. A benchmark score is a measurement, and a measurement supports a claim only about the construct it observes. This is the problem Flake and Fried (2020) and Messick (1995) describe for psychological measures, and it does not change when the thing being measured is an agent. “Solved 40% of the tasks” is a fact about the tasks. Whether it is evidence that a system does science depends entirely on what the tasks required, and most of these task sets deliberately supply the question, the data, and the success criterion. That is to say, they supply most of what meetings 1 through 9 treated as the hard part.
Read that column as an inventory of open problems rather than as criticism. Where a capability the group cares about appears in no existing evaluation, that gap is the group’s opportunity.
Systems that act
| Project | What it is | What it covers | What its results do not establish |
|---|---|---|---|
| Coscientist — Boiko et al. (2023) | Language model with web search, documentation retrieval, code execution, and a robotic liquid handler | Planning and executing a chemical synthesis, including optimizing a catalytic cross-coupling on real hardware | That the system chose the question, or that it transfers beyond tasks with existing published protocols and a defined target |
| The AI Scientist (arXiv:2408.06292) and v2 (arXiv:2504.08066) | End-to-end pipeline: idea generation, experiment execution, paper writing, and automated review | Producing complete machine-learning papers without human intervention; v2 reports a workshop-accepted manuscript | That the findings are ones a field would retain. Automated review is not peer review, and workshop acceptance is a weak filter |
| AI co-scientist (arXiv:2502.18864) | Multi-agent system generating, debating, and ranking hypotheses in a tournament | Proposing biomedical hypotheses, with wet-lab follow-up reported in three areas | General hypothesis quality. The validated cases were selected, and a rate would require the denominator: how many proposals failed |
| TinyScientist (arXiv:2510.06579) | An open framework for assembling research agents, not a result | Tooling: a controllable, extensible harness others can build on | Anything about scientific performance; it is infrastructure, and belongs here as a starting point rather than as evidence |
Benchmarks and evaluations
| Project | What it is | What it covers | What its scores do not establish |
|---|---|---|---|
| ScienceAgentBench — Chen et al. (2025) | 102 executable tasks drawn from 44 peer-reviewed papers, validated by subject-matter experts | Data-driven analysis: given a question and data, produce working code and the right output | Question formation, novelty, or discovery. The task supplies what earlier meetings identified as the difficult and interesting choices |
| MLE-bench (arXiv:2410.07095) | 75 Kaggle competitions run as machine-learning engineering tasks | Engineering competence: building a model that scores well against a defined metric | Any scientific claim. A Kaggle task arrives with the target, the metric, and the guarantee that a solution exists |
| Gravity-Bench-v1 (arXiv:2501.18411) | Simulated gravitational systems where the agent must plan its own observations | Closer to inquiry than most: the agent decides what to measure, under a budget, including out-of-distribution physics | Performance with real instruments, real noise, real calibration, or a real literature to be wrong about |
| LLM-SRBench (arXiv:2504.10415) | Equation-discovery tasks built to resist recall of known formulas | Whether a system can find a governing relation in data rather than retrieve one it has seen | Inquiry beyond the symbolic-regression step. The data, the variables, and the goal are given |
| FML-bench (arXiv:2510.10472) | Machine-learning research tasks scored on multiple axes | Broader research behavior than single-task benchmarks | Transfer outside machine learning, which is the field these agents were largely trained on |
| NovBench — Wu et al. (2026) | Evaluation of model judgments of paper novelty | Whether a model’s novelty assessment agrees with expert assessment on NLP papers | That the judgments transfer to Earth science. Whether they do is itself something to check. See meeting 10 |
Surveys and registries
Two recent surveys cover this space more completely than the tables above and are the right starting point for anyone extending them.
- A Survey of AI Scientists (arXiv:2510.23045). Tie and colleagues, 2025. Broad coverage of automated-scientist systems and their components.
- Autonomous Research Agents: A Survey of AI Scientists and the Verification Gap (arXiv:2608.05179). Ding and colleagues, 2026. Screens a large candidate set down to a coded sample of runnable systems, and organizes them around verification, the same concern as the last column of the tables above.
A survey is a secondary source. Where a claim in one matters to a decision here, read the primary paper.
What is missing from all of them
Collecting the last columns gives the group a short list of capabilities that appear in no evaluation above:
- Choosing the question. Every benchmark supplies it. Meetings 1, 2, and 6 treated question formation as the substance of inquiry.
- Deciding what to measure, and whether the measurement can be trusted. Only Gravity-Bench asks an agent to plan observations, and it does so in simulation with no instrument response. Compare the provenance concerns in meeting 5.
- Reasoning from traces of the past. Nothing here evaluates inference about events that cannot be re-run, which is the mode of meeting 3 and much of this group’s science.
- Recognizing a surprise worth following. Anomaly detection appears; judging an anomaly interesting does not. See meeting 8.
- Abstaining. No benchmark rewards a system for concluding that the evidence is insufficient, though meeting 9 treats that as a competent outcome.
- Field and marine constraint. Ship time, weather, instrument loss, and the plan-versus-reality gap of meeting 7 have no representation at all.
These six are the natural content of the benchmark drafted in meeting 13. Whether any of them can be measured well is itself uncertain, and a benchmark the group cannot actually run is not an improvement over one that exists.
Adding an entry
Corrections and additions are welcome, particularly from anyone who has run one of these systems. Accuracy in the last column matters more than coverage: an entry that overstates a limitation is as much a problem as one that omits it. See how to contribute.